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body. Such a view makes a relation logically prior to the terms which it
relates: the terms of the relation derive their being from standing in the
relation. This view gets things backwards. It is intuitively plausible to view
a relation as dependent for its obtaining on its ontologically independent
terms. Hence, for a soul to exist in relation to its body, each one's existence
must be independent of the relation in which it stands to the other.
Braine will respond that viewing the human being as a substantial soul in
relation to a substantial body destroys the unity of the human being. To
preserve this unity, there must be no question of a substantial soul being
incarnated or re-incarnated with a separately originating body. In defending
this view, however, he is simply at odds with what the ordinary human being
can conceive. For the very reasons he so ably sets forth (e.g., the simplicity
of the T, the phenomenology of perception), the ordinary person is able to
conceive of incarnation and re-incarnation. And this indicates that the ordinary person does not think of himself as unified with his body in the way
that Braine asserts. This is important, because in reading a book such as
Braine's, one often comes away with the impression that dualism is the
invention of a philosopher such as Descartes. But it isn't. Descartes philosophized about dualism; he did not invent it. Where Descartes' view conflicts with the ordinary person's view of the human being is not with regard
to the soul's existence but with respect to its spatiality. When the ordinary
person thinks of the soul, he thinks of it as an ethereal or ghostly entity with
a shape like that of a human body. This lends support to Braine's position
that the ordinary person thinks of himself as a bodily being. Descartes argued
that the soul cannot be in space because anything which is in space is extended and, thereby, divisible into parts. Perhaps, what is needed is a serious
reconsideration of whether or not a substantial soul could both be a bodily
being in space and indivisible. This would involve the soul being a body in
a different sense than its being a physical body, but perhaps such a concept
should not be too readily dismissed.
In conclusion, while Braine's holistic view of the human being is not
without its problems, there is much in The Human Person from which one
can learn. It is a book well worth reading.
Hell: The Logic of Damnation, by Jerry L. Walls. Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1992. Pp. 182. $26.95 (cloth).
THOMAS TALBOTT, Willamette University.
As he expresses it himself, Jerry Walls' purpose in writing his book "is to
shJW that some recognizably traditional views of hell are compatible with
both the divine nature and human nature" (p. 14). He defends a two-fold
thesis: first that, for all we know, God had good reasons to create persons
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with libertarian free will, and second that, for all we know, some of these
persons will freely make a decisive decision for evil and thus against God.
The book is honest, clearly written, and in general free from partisan polemics. It might serve very well as a text for an undergraduate or seminary course
dealing with the topic of hell.
Walls divides his book into an introduction, six chapters, and a conclusion.
In his introduction, he distinguishes between several possible views, ranging
from the traditional popular view, as he calls it, to the convinced universalist
view; he also suggests that "hell [in the sense of everlasting separation from
God] cannot be easily extricated from other theistic beliefs" (p. 7) or from a
fully Christian understanding of salvation (pp. 6-7). He then launches into
a wide-ranging discussion. In "Hell and Human Belief," he asks whether the
origin of the belief in hell "has any bearing on whether or not the doctrine is
true" (p. 17); and he concludes that the historical origin of this belief could,
but in fact does not, have such a bearing. Three chapters follow in which he
discusses hell in relation to some of the divine attributes: In "Hell and Divine
Knowledge," he tries to illustrate the point that "one's views on hell cannot
be isolated from one's views on foreknowledge" (p. 55); in "Hell and Divine
Power," he criticizes both Calvinism and universalism, arguing that they
"share an important similarity in that both assume God can save anyone he
will" (p. 80); and in "Hell and Divine Goodness," he argues that "hell is
compatible with God's perfect goodness," provided that God "is willing to
do whatever he can, short of overriding freedom, to give happiness to all"
(pp. 110-111). The centerpiece of his defense, however, is a chapter entitled
"Hell and Human Freedom," where he argues for the possibility of "a decisive
choice of evil" (p. 117ff) and criticizes my own view that the very idea of
such a choice is deeply incoherent. That is followed by a final chapter, "Hell
and Human Misery," in which he explores the nature of the suffering in hell.
He then concludes his discussion with this observation: When properly understood, the doctrine of hell "has positive moral value," he says, because it "underwrites in a way which perhaps nothing else can the claim that we are
accountable for our actions and cannot escape responsibility for them" (p. 157).
Now as I have said, Walls' main purpose is to articulate and defend a
"recognizably traditional" conception of hell. But I doubt that his own conception would fit such a description. For according to the tradition, hell has
two crucial features: (a) It is a place of terrifying punishment for sin, and
(b) the punishment will literally last forever. So if one believes, as I do, that
the idea of everlasting punishment is riddled with confusion and incoherence, lone must, at the very least, revise the tradition in one of two ways:
One might deny that hell is literally a place of punishment, or, if one continues
to think of it as a place of punishment, one might deny that the punishment
will literally last forever. Whereas many universalists opt for the second
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alternative, Walls apparently opts for the first. For he insists, in the first
place, that "the misery of hell is not so much a penalty imposed by God to
make the sinner pay for his sin, as it is the necessary outcome of living a
sinful life" (p. 150); and he insists, secondly, that those in hell will choose
to remain there of their own free will. Indeed, omnipotent love can do
nothing, short of removing their freedom, to change their minds. But why,
one might ask, would anyone freely choose to remain in hell forever? Because, Walls in effect replies, from the perspective of the damned hell is really
not that bad a place to be; as Walls sees it, "hell may afford its inhabitants a
kind of gratification which motivates the choice to go there" (p. 128). More
than that, the damned will even have a kind of illusory happiness.
Those in hell may be almost happy, and this may explain why they insist on
staying there. They do not, of course, experience even a shred of genuine
happiness. But perhaps they experience a certain perverse sense of satisfaction, a distorted sort of pleasure (p. 126).
Though Walls here denies that the damned are genuinely happy, he does not
deny that they believe themselves to be happy; to the contrary, he insists that,
for some lost souls, the illusion of happiness may endure forever and with
sufficient conviction to explain why they never leave their preferred abode
in hell.
Those who prefer hell to heaven have convinced themselves that it is better.
In their desire to justify their choice of evil, they have persuaded themselves
that whatever satisfaction they experience from evil is superior to the joy
which God offers (p. 129).
This line of thought leads naturally, I would suggest, to the following
conclusion: Because God knows that he can do nothing, short of removing
their freedom, to induce the damned to repent, he simply employs his omn.ipotent power to make them as comfortable as possible and to prevent them
from harming others. Walls does not, it is true, explicitly embrace this idea,
and he may even distance himself from it-somewhat inconsistently-in his
chapter on the misery of hell. But in any event, his own conception seems
far removed from the New Testament picture of a "furnace of fire" in which
people will "weep and gnash their teeth" (Matt. 13 :42) and pray for the
mountains to fall upon them (Rev. 6: 16). It also seems far removed from
Jesus' understanding of the nature of hell. In the parable of the sheep and
the goats (Matt. 25 :31-46), for example, Jesus alludes to a form of punishment
that is neither freely chosen nor expected; and in the parable of the rich man
and Lazarus (Luke 16:16-31), the rich man wants to warn his five brothers
"lest they also come into this place of torment" (16:28). As depicted in the
New Testament, in other words, hell is not the kind of place that even the
wicked would freely choose to inhabit forever. For it really is a place of
unbearable suffering and torment.
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We can appreciate, of course, why Walls might want to water down the
New Testament picture of hell as a place of unbearable suffering; an eternity
of such suffering would be, after all, utterly pointless, and a god who would
actually inflict such suffering would be unspeakably barbaric. It seems to
me, however, that a universalist such as John Hick, who regards hell as a
continuation of the purgatorial sufferings of this life, is in the end more
faithful to the New Testament picture than Walls is. For a universalist can
regard hell as a genuine form of punishment or correction, rather than a freely
embraced condition; hence, a universalist has no need to water down the New
Testament image of unbearable suffering. Perhaps a period of such suffering
is just what a Hitler or a Goebbels needs; and for that matter, perhaps it is
just what they endured during the final days of their earthly life. But though
the New Testament picture clearly includes unbearable suffering, it arguably
does not include unending suffering at all. For in the New Testament, the
Greek adjective, "~\ WV \ 0 <;," which our English Bibles translate as "eternal"
or "everlasting," ~robably signifies divine causality rather than unending
temporal duration.
Be all of that as it may, Walls' own conception is that hell is a freely
embraced condition and one which, for all we know, some may continue to
embrace forever. Essential to such a conception is this idea: God neither
keeps the damned in hell against their will nor undermines completely their
freedom to want to stay there. Walls thus rejects my own view that in the
universe as God has actually created it no illusion can endure forever. He
writes:
Now I am inclined to agree with Talbott that universalism follows if we grant
his claim that no illusion can endure forever. But if he is correct in his
account of why this is so, then it is apparent that God forces some persons
to give up their sinful illusions. For if God causes those persons who continue to rebel against him to grow ever more miserable and tormented, then
it seems that God is imposing on those persons the clear knowledge that he
is the source of happiness, and sin the cause of misery .... So in the end,
the knowledge which makes impossible the choice of damnation is not acquired through free choice, but is itself impossible to avoid (p. 132).

Against the idea that God must finally achieve a complete victory over sin,
Walls thus reasons as follows: For the sake of sustaining human freedom
throughout eternity, God severely limits the misery of hell and makes sure
that he never provides the damned with too clear a revelation of himself.
At this point, however, I begin to suspect a problem of incoherence. I have
no objection to Wall's claim that, on my view, "God forces some persons to
give up their sinful illusions," for that is an accurate description of my view.
As I see it, God does this all the time. A man who, upon entering into an
adulterous affair, makes a total mess of his life may in time learn a hard
lesson, one that he in no way chose to learn; and having learned his lesson,
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he may be utlerly unwilling to repeat the experiment. And similarly for St.
Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus: As I read the account in Acts,
Paul in no way chose to have his illusions shattered; and neither did he choose
to receive a revelation that would in a very brief time transform this "chief
of sinners" into a Christian missionary. But here I would ask: Are not
ignorance, deception, and illusion-which God sometimes does remove
against our will-also obstacles to free choice of the relevant kind? If I am
ignorant of, or deceived about, the true consequences of my choices, then I
am in no position to embrace those consequences freely; and similarly, if I
suffer from an illusion that conceals from me the true nature of God, or the
true import of union with God, then I am again in no position to reject God
freely. I may reject a caricature of God, or a false conception, but I would
be in no position to reject the true God himself. Nor does it help to say, as
Walls does, that the illusions of the damned are "self-inflicted" (p. 129). For
insofar as we can make sense of self-deception at all, it seems to be a protective device that itself arises only in contexts of ambiguity, ignorance, and
confusion; and besides, a self-inflicted deception is no less an obstacle to free
choice than a self-inflicted addiction to alcohol or cocaine. When God shatters our illusions and forces us to see the truth, therefore, he precisely removes an obstacle to the very freedom Walls claims we have: the freedom to
reject not merely a faulty conception of God, but the true God himself.
But in fact there can be no freedom to reject God forever; the very idea of
such a freedom is incoherent. And the irony is that the above quotation,
though intended as a criticism, merely repeats part of my own argument for
this very conclusion. If God should shatter all of my illusions, correct all of
my misconceptions, and provide me with a clear vision of what union with
him entails, he would thereby remove every conceivable motive I might have
to reject him and also provide me with the strongest conceivable motive to
unite with him. In the face of such a clear vision, I would be incapable, Walls
concedes, of rejecting God freely. But that is only half the argument; the
other half, which Walls ignores, is the argument of the previous paragraph.
Accordingly, we might put the full argument in the form of a dilemma. Either
I am fully informed concerning who God is and the consequences of rejecting
him, or I am not. If I am not fully informed, then (as we saw in the previous
paragraph) I am in no position to reject the true God at all; and if I am fully
informed, then (as Walls himself concedes) I am incapable of rejecting God
freely. So in neither case am I free to reject the true God. And neither,
according to Paul, do any of us choose our own destiny, which "depends not
upon man's will or exertion, but upon God's mercy" (Rom. 9:16). The importance of freedom, I would therefore suggest, lies elsewhere, namely in
this: Free choice-not choosing rightly as opposed to wrongly, but the reality
of free choice itself-is an essential part of the process whereby God reveals
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his true nature to us and teaches us the (occasionally hard) lessons we need
to learn as we travel the road to redemption.
For these reasons (and others), I find Wall's conception of hell uncompelling. But I am pleased to recommend his book nonetheless. For it is a
thoughtful discussion of a difficult topic, a valuable review of some important
arguments, and a genuine source of insight.
NOTES
1. I have set forth my reasons for believing this in "Punishment, Forgiveness, and Divine
Justice," Religious Studies. vol. 29 (June, 1993), pp. 151-68.

2. I defend this claim in an unpublished paper, "Three Pictures of God in Westem
Theology," Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 12 (1995), pp. 77-94.

Speaking of A Personal God: An Essay in Philosophical Theology, by Vincent
Brummer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. ix and 160.
$44.95 (Cloth), $14.95 (Paper).

JOHN GRECO, Fordham University
The main thesis of Vincent Brummer's book is that philosophical theology
has an essential contribution to make to the theological quest of faith seeking
understanding. In the first two chapters of the book Brummer clarifies this
thesis and defends it against the objection that philosophical methodology is
inappropriate for the subject matter of theology. In the remaining chapters
Brummer attempts to illustrate the merits of philosophical theology via an
investigation of the conceptually thorny claim that human beings can be in
a personal relationship with God. In these chapters Brummer investigates
the Reformed doctrine of grace, the ability of God to do evil, the intelligibility
of double agency, and the possibility of a consoling and morally sensitive
theodicy. The book ends with an epilogue in which Brummer summarizes
his conclusions regarding the relationship between philosophy and theology.
The book is persuasively argued, and almost always a model of clarity.
Whether one is interested in the methodological or the substantive issues
treated here, Brummer's book will be found interesting and worthwhile.
As I have said Brummer treats a wide range of material, but in this review
I will restrict myself to two main issues. First, I will discuss Brummer's view
of the nature of philosophical theology and its relation to theological inquiry
in general, and I will try to resolve what might seem to be an inconsistency
in Brummer's view of what philosophical theology is. Second, I will briefly
summarize Brummer's conclusions regarding talk about a personal God, and
I will argue that Brummer's attempt to provide a morally sensitive theodicy
fails.

